

1
29

June 2024

Vol. 29
No. 1

The European Union Review

Editor Dario Velo

The European Union Review

ISBN 979-12-5965-410-6

ISSN 1606-8963



9 791259 654106



9 771606 896007

€ 60,00



CACUCCI  EDITORE
BARI

ISSN 1606-8963

June 2024

Vol. 29
No. 1

The European Union Review

Editor Dario Velo

CACUCCI  EDITORE
BARI

Editor: Dario Velo (dario.velo.pv@gmail.com)
Publisher: Cacucci Editore S.a.s.
Editorial Address: Via D. Nicolai, 39
70122 Bari
fax +39 080 5234777
e-mail: riviste@cacuccieditore.it
Home page: <http://www.cacuccieditore.it>
Editorial Coordinator: Silvia Bruzzi (bruzzi@economia.unige.it)
Editing: Michele de Serio (mdeserio@cacucci.it)

Manuscript Submission

Review Process

According to international scientific standards, since 1996 The European Union Review has undergone a double-blinded peer review process. Papers submitted for publication will be therefore reviewed by three anonymous referees with recommendations and comments reported to the author. Following review, authors may be asked to revise the paper to address reviewers' comments for possible publication. Final positive decision of reviewers is a requirement for the acceptance of the paper.

Submission Guidelines

Manuscripts should be sent to the Editor at the Editorial Address for submission procedure. The manuscript should be accompanied by a covering letter stating that the article has not been published, or submitted for publication, elsewhere. Authors are asked to submit three copies of their manuscript as well as an identical electronic copy on computer disk, typed in Word (or RTF) format. Short titles are invited for use as running heads. The author should submit a short biography of him or herself and a 50-80 words abstract along with three keywords both in English and French.

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

© 2024 Cacucci Editore S.a.s. – Bari

<http://www.cacuccieditore.it> e-mail: info@cacucci.it

According to international copyright law, this book may not be reproduced without the consent of the Editor and the publisher.

Autorizzazione del Tribunale di Pavia n. 459 del 25 luglio 1996
Direttore responsabile: DARIO VELO

Editor

Dario Velo

University of Pavia, Italy

Scientific Board

Rainer Arnold

University of Regensburg, Germany

Sergio Arzeni

OCDE, France

Léonce Bekemans

Rickevelde Bruges, Belgium

Claude Blumann

University Panthéon-Assas, France

Franco Bruni

Bocconi University, Italy

Silvia Bruzzi

University of Genoa, Italy

Oreste Calliano

University of Torino, Italy

Franco di Sciullo

University of Messina, Italy

Jean Claude Dischamps

Association Internationale des Economistes,
France

Daniel P. Fata

German Marshall Plan, USA

Flavio Felice

University of Molise, Italy

Daniela Felisini

University of Tor Vergata, Italy

Jean-Claude Gautron

University of Bordeaux I, France

Stephen George

University of Sheffield, England

Gianvito Giannelli

University of Bari

José Maria Gil-Robles

University of Madrid, Spain

Ernestina Giudici

University of Cagliari, Italy

Alexander Graf Lambsdorff

Member of the European Parliament,
Germany

Stefen Griller

University of Wien, Austria

Rudolf Hrbek

University of Tübingen, Germany

Emanuele Itta

University of Lecce, Italy

Dermot Keogh

University College Cork, Ireland

Giuliana Laschi

University of Bologna, Italy

Pia Letto-Vanamo

University of Helsinki, Finland

Salvatorangelo Loddo

University of Pavia, Italy

Marc Maresceau

University of Gent, Belgium

Marco Mascia

University of Padova, Italy

Carlos Francisco Molina del Pozo

University of Madrid, Spain

Willem T. M. Molle

University of Rotterdam, Netherlands

Peter-Christian Müller-Graff

University of Heidelberg, Germany

Claudio Palazzolo

University of Pisa, Italy

Lodovico Passerin d'Entrevès

C.S. Bank of Italy, Italy

Ugo Patroni Griffi

University of Bari, Italy

Sergio Pistone

University of Torino, Italy

Paulo Pitta e Cunha

University of Lisboa, Portugal

Franco Praussello

University of Genova, Italy

Daniela Preda

University of Genova, Italy

Pasquale Preziosa

Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force, Italy

Alberto Quadrio Curzio

Catholic University, Italy

Hjalte Rasmussen

University of Copenhagen, Denmark

Marcelo Resico

Pontificia Universidad Católica, Argentina

Michele Ruta

International Monetary Fund, USA

Alberta Sbragia

University of Pittsburgh, USA

Carlo Secchi

Bocconi University, Italy

Constantin Stephanou

University of Athens, Greece

Antonio Tizzano

La Sapienza University, Italy

Antonio Felice Uricchio

University of Bari

Eugenio Fernando Yáñez Rojas

University Adolfo Ibáñez, Chile

Editorial Board

Silvia Bruzzi, *Coordinator*

Paola Bua, Enrica Pavione,

Jean-Gaëtan Recorbet, Francesco Velo

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

EDITORIAL

p.

The 2024 European Elections: Continuity and Changes

Dario Velo

9

EUROPEAN LAW

Proposal for a Common European Model of Non-Conviction Based Confiscation

Stefano Finocchiaro, Giulia Tavella, Vincenzo Riganti

23

ECONOMY

Energy and the European Economic Union: Hints from Renewables

Silvia Bruzzi

57

INSTITUTIONS

A Human-centric Model of Integration: Citizenship and Participation in the EU

Léonce Bekemans

75

THE MASTERS OF FEDERALISM

Luigi Vittorio Majocchi

Dario Velo

107

Antonio Papisca

Léonce Bekemans

111

Value Roots for Multi-level Governance and Intercultural Dialogue

Antonio Papisca

113

SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY

A Civitas Humana. Towards a Plural and Federal International Order

Flavio Felice

135

EDITORIAL

The 2024 European Elections: Continuity and Changes

Dario Velo*

1. Foreword

2024 will see the European elections. The electoral campaign has already begun but the new ways in which it is developing make the contents and logic that aspire to assert itself difficult to understand.

The comparison between the electoral campaign in full swing in the United States for the 2024 elections and the European electoral campaign is illuminating.

In the United States, two potential candidates are competing, supported by two opposing sides. At stake is the conquest of power, the control of federal powers to realize the democratic or republican options. Other objectives complete this strategic content; the fundamental issue is the political control of power.

In Europe we are going in the same direction, but the journey is still so long that it does not allow us to clearly define right now whether the plan is to repeat the American experience, *mutatis mutandis*.

The objective of this paper is to verify whether it is possible to outline a provisional interpretation, without developing an analysis of the positions of the individual governments and parties that have begun to confront each other. It will be up to the candidates and parties to clarify their positions, and it will be up to the citizens to evaluate these same positions with their vote.

* *University of Pavia, Italy*

2. The Role Played in the Past by European Elections

For many editions, the European elections have represented the opportunity for a plebiscite in favor of European unification. Even before the vote, the agreement was already guaranteed that in the mid-term there would be a relay in the Presidency of the European Parliament between the two large coalitions, centre-left and centre-right. This relay was of fundamental importance for the European Parliament, endowed with limited powers, whose role could have developed provided it was supported by a broad political front, de facto an agreement of “national unity” at the European level.

This phase is running out. The transfer of powers from the Member States to the unification process has reached a significant dimension, making the role played by the European Government increasingly important within the framework of the overall Government of the different institutional levels of the European Union.

The next European elections will see the struggle for power increase and the way in which European Government is conceived will change. It is realistic to foresee a transition phase, in which the certainties of the past and the new visions being established will coexist.

In this transition phase, predictable but not yet defined, we will see changes in leadership capable of influencing processes.

In the past, when the European Union was made up of a limited number of member countries, it was easy to identify two sides with different strategies. On one side were the leading countries with greater capabilities, capable of developing the Government necessary to advance the unification process and address problems to guarantee development. Germany and France are generally identified as the two countries and the two systems as key components of this first deployment. It was these two countries that played an initiating and directing role in the unification process.

A second group was made up of countries with fewer capabilities, led by their own characteristics to favour an ideological approach.

The political forces were influenced by belonging to the State that made up one of the two sides.

The greatest interpreter of the role of the first deployment was Jean Monnet; greatest interpreter of the ideological approach was Altiero Spinelli. The two approaches have never been in antithesis, but they certainly played a different role in the process of European unification.

This scenario is destined to gradually change more and more. The process of change has already begun. When the European elections more clearly take on the character of competition for power, all political forces will be faced with the need to seek autonomy with respect to the policies of the states to which they belong. The consensus will focus on the policies to be developed, not only on the need to strengthen the unification process but also on the design of which Europe to develop.

In an initial phase, the legacy of the past will remain, that is, the role of the control room of the unification process which will be able to register a renewed composition. The change will be unstoppable, and the certainty of its developments will allow some foreseeable changes to be actualized.

Current language has registered this turning point, albeit inadequately. The critical position of the Brussels authorities towards some of our country's behaviours have traditionally been defined as interference by EU bureaucrats towards Italy; in 2023 the language changed, the responsibilities of European bureaucrats began to be defined in our country as the responsibilities of European politicians. The change, certainly significant, was not immediately understood in its scope.

An anecdote serves to recall how some have been aware of the inevitability of this evolution, in the long term, for a long time. At the end of the sixties of the twentieth century a debate took place in Pavia, with the participation of Malagodi, some federalists and other men of culture. Malagodi's speech left an impression on many present due to his lucidity, regardless of his commitment to the Liberal Party. The essential content can be briefly summarized: the role of radical federalists is destined to end when the competition for power at the European level begins; to this analysis a radical federalist, esteemed by all for his upright life (he had opted to pursue a profession that would have allowed him to self-finance his studies and his ethical commitment with just a few hours of work) contrasted the belief that the federalist ideology it would have retained its validity and ability to profoundly influence the forces that would fuel the competition for power.

Decades later, facts today confirm Malagodi's far-sighted vision. In all European countries, federalist organizations are in difficulty, others have integrated with the consolidated powers.

Malagodi's analysis corresponded to that developed by Jean Monnet. The position of the federalist from Pavia was perhaps influenced by the limits of the initiative of our country, prisoner of an ideological role.

Years later Tommaso Padoa Schioppa took up Malagodi's analysis again, giving a faithful interpretation: "I am convinced that the point of no return can only be strictly political (...) it is the moment in which the political struggle becomes European, in which the object for which men and parties fight will be European power. That will be the moment in which the (federalist) revolution will have finished its task and the new orders created will be occupied by ordinary political forces, who will make it the theater of their dispute".

We have reached this stage. The re-orientation that the process requires hides pitfalls, as always happens in transitions. The pitfalls must be understood in advance, to reduce their danger.

3. Federation, Confederation, Strengthened Cooperation

In the general context that we have summarized, we need to ask ourselves what will predictably be the most relevant issues on which the political forces will discuss during the European electoral campaign. Some themes will represent the development of traditional debates, others will represent innovations connected to the new powers of the European Government.

The federation/confederation alternative has marked all phases of the European unification process, from the initial phases to the current phase. The alternative has taken different forms over time, so the terminology federation versus confederation is considered by many to be a simplification that does not capture the complexity of the positions developed from time to time.

According to this vision, the two constitutional alternatives represent two fundamental ideal types, to find a line of continuity in the multiple positions that have emerged over time.

Altiero Spinelli is considered the unshakable defender of the federal model as the goal of European unification. The source of his belief is the US experience. The debate that defined the American Constitution is summarized in "The Federalist," written by the three founding fathers Hamilton, Jay and Madison at the end of the eighteenth century. In the US experience, the federal model was fully defined by the constituent process at the beginning of the life of the United States; in parallel, the institutions necessary to provide the federal government with all the fundamental powers were created.

The confederal model was defended by those who believed the transfer of broad powers from the States to the Federation was premature. In Europe this position has generally been identified in the positions taken by De Gaulle.

In reality, the contrast between the two federation/confederation alternatives focused on the speed with which to develop the process of federal unification. The federalist positions in Spinelli's interpretation aimed to bring together a constituent assembly, following the historical US example, and to define from the beginning of European unification the constitution and institutions necessary to ensure adequate government. The merit of Jean Monnet was to find a synthesis between the two alternatives, recognizing the federal nature of the unification process and identifying the achievements capable of advancing the unification process, concretizing individual chapters of the European constitution which would thus be gradually completed.

Spinelli's approach was ideological, Monnet's was strategic, capable of understanding the spaces for an initiative capable of addressing and solving the problems that had matured.

This schematization synthetically describes the script that developed in the first phase of European unification.

The success of the unification process brought other aspects into play. The transfer of power to the unification process fuelled the first forms of European power struggle. The expansion of the European Union to new states has diluted the homogeneity that had previously characterized the European structure; the countries and political forces favourable to establishing a vanguard and the countries and political forces most favourable to a wait-and-see position were outlined.

The federation/confederation alternative continued to characterize the unification process, but the emergence of the beginning of a struggle for power and the division between vanguard and rearguard countries changed the relative importance of the first script written by the Founding Fathers.

A decisive turning point occurred with the European Monetary Union. In fact, the Monetary Union was born as a form of strengthened cooperation, even before this legal form was approved, with the accession of the avant-garde countries and the right to join at a later date for the other countries, under certain conditions.

The framework that has thus been defined can be considered articulated, capable of incorporating differentiated requests, without undermining the progress already achieved.

The debate that has begun in view of the 2024 elections appears complex on the surface. It recalls the opposition between federation and confederation, it evokes strengthened cooperation and structured cooperation. In reality, the debate tends to favour certain aspects of the European order, which more closely correspond to the thesis of the states and political forces that seek to use the spaces that have opened up at a European level.

The traditional alternative between progressive and conservative parties is seeing its impact diminish, other architectures are being defined in a process destined to continue over time. The European elections will gradually favour, in their succession, these changes which are not easily foreseeable for now.

The historical experience of the European unification process can contribute to understanding the debate that will develop in view of the next European elections.

4. Presidentialism and Parliamentary Government

In Europe, countries with different traditions coexist to reconcile the efficiency of government and loyalty to traditions, to guarantee good governance and respect for popular sovereignty. Monarchies, presidential and parliamentary governments constitute the most widespread forms, however with significant differentiations. The framework is evolving as the constitutions have been modified in an attempt to provide effective responses to the new problems that have emerged in individual countries.

The changes that have occurred in European countries in recent decades respond to common concerns. In particular, it is a good approximation to identify the problem that we have tried to address with constitutional reforms is the weakening of the ability to develop an effective and authoritative government.

The process of European unification has progressively transferred a series of related competences and powers from the national level to the European level. Faced with this reality, the illusion of national sovereignty has survived; the development of sovereignist forces, inspired by the desire to re-establish the national state in its centrality in public life, has sharpened the contradiction between the new historical reality and the traditional organization of power. Presidentialism has been seen in some states as the solution to reaffirm greater government capacity at the national level.

The development of European Government is inevitably destined to be influenced by these opposing trends. With a certain approximation, it is fair to say that the model of parliamentary government has established itself at a European level, from the beginning of the unification process until today. The model of European parliamentary government has strengthened over time, thanks primarily to the initiative of the European Parliament. A synthetic reconstruction of this reality can constitute an ideal *typus* for understanding the contrasts that will develop during the European elections. The sovereigntist ideological vision is destined to confront the reality of European parliamentary government.

A constitutional problem should not be confused with a party problem. Here it is in our interest to grasp the most important constitutional aspects.

The fundamental principle on which European parliamentary government is based is that the Government of the Commission must enjoy the trust of Parliament; the relations between the Commission and Parliament have changed over time and the outcome has been a strengthening of the procedures that guarantee trust between the two fundamental bodies of the Union. This is the fundamental difference that distinguishes the European model from presidentialism and systems that provide for a clear separation of powers.

The institutional architecture of the European Union is relatively simple and has not undergone significant changes since the beginning of unification with the creation of the E.C.S.C. until today: a representative assembly of citizens (later to become the European Parliament), the European Commission with government functions, the Court of Justice, the European Council representing the member states.

The principle of separation of powers has always been respected but the European experience has gone further. The functions at European level have been divided so as to reduce the possibility of abusing the power granted to each institution. More organs have been called upon to contribute to exercising a certain function. This solution reduced the possibility of centralization in a more effective and at the same time simpler way than guaranteed by the separation of powers regulated on a constitutional basis.

This solution was inspired by J. Monnet, who in turn made use of his knowledge of the German and Swiss constitutions. Over the years, the German experience has increasingly influenced European choices. Spinelli's approach had less impact, inspired by the US experience which was less attentive to avoiding forms of centralisation.

The importance of the procedures that regulate the role of the European Parliament for the election of the Commission confirm that the institutional architecture of the Union has been able to incorporate the developments of the struggle for power without calling into question the results obtained previously in the course of the unification process. It is this ability that makes regression more difficult than the possibility of progressing in European construction.

The parliamentary system is now rooted in the European experience compared to the presidential or semi-presidential system.

The strengthening of the role of the European Parliament in the election of the President of the European Commission and the Commissioners means that the President of the Commission has in turn strengthened himself in relation to the Governments of the Member States. The balance of power changes, making political consensus increasingly important compared to the formally required quorums.

It is the overall political dimension that allows us to summarize the role of the European Council as representative of the member states and the role of the European Parliament as representative of the citizens.

5. The European Constitution and the International Order. The Defense Problem

An essential role in every state is played by defense. It is a widely held belief that a state cannot be called such if it does not have an autonomous defense capable of guaranteeing its sovereignty.

The defense problem is a constant in the unification process and is destined to arise again in the European electoral debate, today and in the future.

The first attempt to provide the European Union with an autonomous defense dates back to the beginning of the unification process. Already in that first experience, two opposing visions emerged, which will always characterize the European picture whenever the organization of autonomous defense is discussed.

In the aftermath of the foundation of the CECA Monnet designed the European Defense Community (CED) substantially replicating the statute of the CECA; also in this case he did not sign the project, leaving the credit for having conceived it to a French public man (every year Europe Day coincides

with the anniversary of the Schuman declaration, written and brought to success by Monnet; his stature as Maestro did not need recognition).

This approach was not shared by Spinelli who, influenced by “The Federalist” and the American precedent, supported the convocation of a constituent assembly which would also, but not only, define the statute of European defence.

The constitutional gradualism supported by Monnet thus contrasted with Spinelli’s ideological approach.

The importance of finding a solution to the problem of European defense consistent with the international order in force at the time was at the centre of Monnet’s concerns, aware of the need for a realistic approach. This concern was absent in Spinelli’s approach: ideology can underestimate the impact of reality, at least in the short term.

As a result, Spinelli sought the support of the federalists. Monnet convinced Eisenhower and Dulles of the synergy between European defense and US military leadership.

The international order in force in those years was dominated by the US-USSR confrontation. The expansion of the Soviet Union into Eastern Europe fuelled the fears of European countries, primarily those closest to the Iron Curtain, aware that only the United States could guarantee their security. A European army could only have been organized over a relatively long period of time, during which European countries would have been exposed to the risk of succumbing in the event of an invasion by the Red Army.

This precedent has significant points of contact with the current situation; it is foreseeable that the 2024 European election will see opposing positions similar to those supported over half a century earlier by Monnet and Spinelli. About half of the European Union member countries have signed bilateral agreements with the United States to protect themselves from the risks of conflict, with additional measures to those already envisaged by NATO. These countries consist of the area closest to the borders of the Russian Federation. This behaviour may or may not be approved; it must be understood, it is dictated by fear. The war fought in Ukraine, which primarily pits the United States and the Russian Federation, has strengthened this trend and justified it in the eyes of public opinion in this area.

The fact that the script that we will presumably see develop in the near future may repeat experiences already experienced does not lessen the uncertainties

about its developments. The directions that will arise from the European election cannot be taken for granted.

6. The European Central Bank and National Sovereignties

It took three decades to reach the approval of the European Monetary Union, overcoming opposition considered insurmountable. The debate was particularly animated when it came to defining the statute of the European Central Bank. The opposing positions can be traced back to two symmetrical opinions.

A first position consisted in maintaining the role of the national central banks. This plan was believed to be faithful to the classic Keynesian approach and would have allowed the Central Banks to be used to cover national deficits in public spending. It corresponded to a confederal model. This position did not need to be clearly explained, drawing strength, according to those who supported it, from the evidence of the current order.

A different position, which will assert itself with the definition of the statute of the European Central Bank, hypothesized the reduction of the role of monetary policy by strengthening the role of real policies. This position was innovative and placed a mortgage on the overall European order.

To evaluate the debate destined to develop during the next European elections, the reasons why the choice of the current statute of the European Central Bank was imposed and at the same time the reasons that animated the opposing forces must be kept in mind. Forces not convinced of the validity of the choice made will likely try to introduce modifications whenever they identify a space for their initiative.

It is necessary to focus attention on the centrally important topic discussed at the time, to predict the contents of the future European electoral debate. Less important, although worthy of consideration, are the technical aspects.

The traditional structure of the national state assigns control of the Central Bank to the executive, to help finance public spending. This solution, brought to a European level, implies a European centralist option.

The subsidiary and federal option implies the autonomy of the Central Bank; the nature of the choice has a constitutional dimension, the European federal model. The subsidiary and federal option has resulted in a statute of

the European Central Bank qualified by the cardinal principle of monetary stability.

This principle was seen, by those who were bearers of a traditional culture, as a conservative, deflationary choice, an obstacle to the adoption of expansionary inflationary policies. An approach that enhances the constitutional perspective as an interpretative criterion offers a completely different point of view.

A subsidiary constitutional order requires that money must not be used to centralize power, reducing the autonomy of regions and local powers, of Member States, of intermediate bodies. Monetary stability hinders the arbitrary movement of resources by those who control the Bank. The principle of subsidiarity requires that the governance mechanisms of the European Central Bank prevent the abuse of power.

The position against the autonomy of the European Central Bank has become a position shared by sovereignists; ultimately the real option that supports this position is exit from the Monetary Union to recover national sovereignty. The effect of this decision, where it is taken, is the weakening of the single market, to the point of its dissolution.

The creation of a currency not subservient to the power of the prince in the framework of the European unification process has called into question the traditional division of powers; the role of the prince was assumed by the constitutional rules developed in a democratic way. A democratic government of money on the basis of constitutional rules is part of the European project of building the European Union as the most advanced rule of law in history. The European currency conceived in this way could have the consent of the member countries as it did not create a centralization of power at a European level. The alternative of austerity versus budget deficit divided interests; the search for a broad consensus on the part of the member countries was the *sine qua non* for transferring monetary sovereignty from the Member States to the unification process.

Relating the characteristics of the Monetary Union with the crucial problems that had to be resolved allows us to understand the extent of the problems to be faced in the near future to justify a modification of the solutions adopted at the time.

7. Fiscal Federalism, Welfare State, Investments and Development

The Werner Plan envisaged the foundation of the European Economic and Monetary Union. Monetary Union was created, essential to guarantee the single market; the Economic Union was postponed.

The struggle for power which, as we have seen, will increasingly characterize the European elections will see opposing positions on economic policies which together will define which European Economic Union will gather the necessary consensus.

Contrasting positions that have characterized European treaties already concluded will recur; those who did not then obtain the necessary consensus will try to reopen the debate.

Aspects of the Economic Union that have not yet been addressed will be the subject of a constituent debate, either as a whole or gradually election after election.

The main aspects that will predictably be the subject of the electoral debate and its subsequent developments are the definition of the model of fiscal federalism to be developed, the modifications deemed appropriate to the welfare state, the development strategies and the governance of investments.

All these aspects will be influenced by the international order; this makes it more difficult to predict which solutions will prevail.

The term fiscal federalism has a precise meaning: it is the distribution of functions and resources among the components of the European Union. Where vertical subsidiarity is considered, fiscal federalism describes this distribution between European, national, regional and local levels. Where horizontal subsidiarity is considered, this distribution also refers to public and private entities that contribute to carrying out activities of general interest.

The member countries of the Union are also profoundly distinguished by the level of fiscal federalism that characterizes them internally. This is set to have a significant influence on the level of fiscal federalism that can be extended to a European level with their consent.

The same applies to the economic and social aspects that can be the field of application of fiscal federalism.

These differences require the search for a common minimum denominator that is more easily acceptable to all Member States. This objective is nothing other than the definition of the European Economic Union according to a model of shared fiscal federalism, attributable to the model of the European Union

defined during the unification process and respectful of the fundamental values underlying the unification process itself.

In summary, to grasp some underlying trends that will need to be debated, it is possible to predict that:

- certainly, some countries and some political forces will support the need to strengthen the role of European institutions in promoting and governing investments and development;
- it is foreseeable that some countries and some political forces will try to assert the autonomy of the Member States in defining the welfare state model;
- the subject of conflicting visions will be the constraint of balancing public accounts. At the financial level, fiscal federalism will assert itself supported by broad consensus depending on the destination of resources; the use of debt will divide the parties based on its use to support investments and development versus the welfare state;
- the economic dimension of defense is destined to influence the debate on these issues as a whole.

This schematization is valid as a first approximation to orient thought, it is not valid to describe the complexity of the problems that will be discussed in the European and national electoral campaigns.

One hypothesis should be taken into consideration to conclude this summary: the creation of new organizations as a form of fiscal federalism based on strengthened cooperation. These organizations may be founded by some promoting countries and be open to subsequent membership. The birth of the European Central Bank can be remembered, with a relatively free interpretation, as an alternative of this kind; which confirms the interest in adopting similar solutions to overcome obstacles to the progress of the unification process. The interest in adopting similar solutions suggests that the European elections could represent an opportunity for a free discussion on the compatibility between strengthened cooperation and fiscal federalism.